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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the applicability of textualism to the executive
branch. It claims that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the primary
theoretical arguments for the new textualism apply with full force to statuto-
ry interpretation by administrative agencies and most other executive offi-
cials. It also points out, however, that proponents of the new textualism
have endorsed a variety of legal doctrines that increase executive power in
ways that are incompatible with textualist theory. The Article claims that
recent efforts by prominent textualists to explain the apparent tension be-
tween their theories of executive and judicial power are either beside the
point or unpersuasive. The Article therefore concludes that their broader
legal theory, which simultaneously embraces the new textualism and un-
bridled executive discretion, is fundamentally incoherent.
* Associate Dean for Research & Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State
University College of Law. I am grateful to Noga Morag-Levine and the other participants
in this Symposium for valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article.
I also received helpful feedback on the project at a faculty workshop at Michigan State Uni-
versity College of Law. Finally, I would like to thank Luke Hennings for helpful research
assistance.
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[T]he balancing of various legal, practical and political considerations, none of
which is absolute, is the very essence of prosecutorial discretion. To take this
away is to remove the core of the prosecutorial function, and not merely "some"
Presidential control.
The Court has, nonetheless, replaced the clear constitutional prescription that the
executive power belongs to the President with a "balancing test.". . . Evidently, the
governing standard is to be what might be called the unfettered wisdom of a major-
ity of this Court, revealed to an obedient people on a case-by-case basis. This is
not only not the government of laws that the Constitution established; it is not a
government of laws at all.*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant developments in American public law dur-
ing the past quarter century has been the rise of the new textualism in statu-
tory interpretation. This methodological approach, which is advocated most
prominently by Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook, relies
upon the core proposition that courts should interpret a statute by ascertain-
ing the plain meaning of its text when the statute was enacted.' Not only
has textualism been credited with reviving academic interest in the field of
legislation,2 but there is a widespread belief that this theory has had a major
impact on the way that virtually all mainstream judges and scholars under-
stand and approach the process of statutory interpretation.
Although a heavy reliance on statutory text is hardly novel,' the new
textualism has caught on in recent years by incorporating lessons from polit-
ical science about the nature of the legislative process and related constitu-
tional arguments about the legitimate role of the judiciary in a representative
democracy with separated powers.' These considerations allegedly lead to
** Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708, 711-12 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1. See, e.g., In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook,
J.); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 14-37 (1997); see also WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 236 (2d ed. 2006) (ex-
plaining that "the meaning an ordinary speaker of the English language would draw from the
statutory text is the alpha and the omega of statutory interpretation" for a new textualist).
2. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory
in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241 (1992).
3. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLuM. L. REv. 1,
30-36 (2006) (describing textualism's broad appeal and impact).
4. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L.
REv. 417, 417-18, 419 (1899) ("We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only
what the statute means.").
5. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Textualism]. See also infra Part I.
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the conclusion that a successfully enacted statute is a "deal" between com-
peting private interests that should be enforced by the judiciary according to
its plain terms.' Any other view would be hopelessly naive and incompati-
ble with the structure of the United States Constitution. Taken to its logical
conclusion, therefore, the new textualism would even forbid courts from
exercising equitable discretion or departing from clear statutory language to
avoid absurd results when they engage in statutory interpretation.'
Like the proponents of other theories of statutory interpretation, advo-
cates of the new textualism have focused almost exclusively on the appro-
priate role of the judiciary in this enterprise.' It is widely understood, how-
ever, that the judiciary does not have primary responsibility for interpreting
statutes in the modem regulatory state.9 Rather, this task is performed in-
itially, and often exclusively, by administrative agencies and other executive
officials who are delegated authority to implement federal programs.'o Yet,
the manner in which the executive branch does and should carry out this
task has only recently begun to receive scholarly attention." And, paradox-
ically, almost no one believes that executive officials are obligated to be
textualists when they interpret statutes.
6. See generally Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001 (2006)
[hereinafter Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity] (describing textualism's conception of the
legislative process and constitutional structure).
7. See Manning, Textualism, supra note 5; John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doc-
trine, 116 HARv. L. Rev. 2387 (2003) [hereinafter Manning, Absurdity]; John C. Nagle,
Textualism's Exceptions 2 (2002), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/artl5 (claim-
ing that "when the statutory text admits of no ambiguity, then the results of that interpreta-
tion-absurd or otherwise-become irrelevant to the textualist").
8. For the most notable exception, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in
Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Judicial Dis-
cretion]. See also infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text (discussing Easterbrook's posi-
tion).
9. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Pre-
liminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 501, 502-03 (2005)
(recognizing that the modem regulatory state is "a legal world where agencies are, by neces-
sity, the primary official interpreters of federal statutes").
10. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1190, 1196 (2006) (recognizing that statutory interpretation is "a core
function of the executive branch," and explaining "that in a great many instances of execu-
tive branch statutory interpretation, the question of judicial review does not arise").
11. See Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How
Chevron Misconceives the Function ofAgencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 673
(2007); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A Di-
alogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 889
(2007); Mashaw, supra note 9; Morrison, supra note 10; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies
Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss,
59 ADMIN. L. REv. 197 (2007); see also Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary
Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative
History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1990).
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This Article begins an examination of the applicability of textualism to
the executive branch. Part I provides an overview of the theoretical under-
pinnings of the new textualism and explains that the theory is purportedly
driven by a constitutionally motivated understanding of legislation and the
proper role of unelected officials who are responsible for implementing the
law. Part II claims that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the primary
theoretical arguments for the new textualism apply with full force to statuto-
ry interpretation by administrative agencies and most executive branch offi-
cials. Part III points out, however, that no one has even tried to suggest that
executive branch officials are obligated to implement statutes in a textualist
fashion. Justice Scalia, for example, is practically an advocate of "dynamic
statutory interpretation" when it comes to the executive branch's role in this
enterprise.12 Indeed, the most strident advocates of textualism are generally
the strongest proponents of broad and unconstrained executive discretion,
even when this authority could be used to undermine countless legislative
deals. For example, textualists routinely defend the absolute enforcement
discretion of executive officials, as well as binding judicial deference to-
ward reasonable interpretations of "ambiguous" statutory provisions by
federal agencies." Accordingly, there is considerable tension between tex-
tualist theory and the positions that are taken by textualists regarding execu-
tive branch authority.
Part IV explains that some prominent textualists have begun to recog-
nize this tension and seek to distinguish the proper role of the executive
branch and judiciary in implementing statutes.14 Although these arguments
may persuasively explain why a fair amount of executive discretion is ne-
cessary and appropriate, they are not responsive to the observation that the
primary theoretical arguments for textualism apply to most instances of
executive branch statutory interpretation. Moreover, the strict separation of
governmental functions and formal division between law and policy that
tacitly underlie these arguments tend to break down in precisely the relevant
contexts. Finally, the "political accountability" of the chief executive that is
routinely invoked in favor of broad claims of executive authority is not
meaningful enough, in reality, to carry the heavy weight that is assigned to
it by theories of this nature. On the contrary, the teachings of public choice
theory that purportedly underlie the new textualism would suggest that the
12. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 897 (1983) ("The ability [of the fed-
eral bureaucracy] to lose or misdirect laws can be said to be one of the prime engines of
social change, and the prohibition against such carelessness is (believe it or not) profoundly
conservative."); see also infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
14. See Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8; Jack Goldsmith & John F.
Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280 (2006).
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dangers of political faction are magnified in the context of unconstrained
decision making by the executive.
The Article therefore concludes that a "faithful agent" of the legisla-
ture could always adhere to the plain meaning of a statute or be capable of
exercising a reasonable degree of policy discretion, but an advocate of the
new textualism cannot have it both ways. Making the latter choice demon-
strates, moreover, that the constitutional and legislative-process based ar-
guments for textualism are ultimately unpersuasive, even to the most com-
mitted textualists. Although a heavy emphasis on the text could still be
defended in statutory interpretation for other reasons, modem textualist
theory loses much of its content and force when stripped of those underpin-
nings.
I. THE NEW TEXTUALISM IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The traditional goal of statutory interpretation has been to ascertain the
legislature's intent with respect to the precise question at issue." The new
textualism, which emerged as a distinctive methodological approach during
the Reagan Administration, rejects this principle and posits that the only
legitimate goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the "plain meaning"
of the text to an ordinary speaker of English when the statute was enacted."
The advocates of this approach have provided spirited critiques of the judi-
ciary's use of legislative history to determine what Congress sought to
achieve when it enacted a statute." They maintain that the judiciary should
rely instead on textual sources of meaning, including the ordinary under-
standing of relevant statutory provisions, related parts of the same act and
the whole code, and longstanding canons of statutory construction, to de-
termine what the elected officials who participated in the lawmaking
process formally agreed "to say."" A statute's underlying purpose and its
policy consequences in a particular case may only be considered under this
approach to choose from among two or more linguistically permissible
15. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 221; DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 89 (1991).
16. See Frickey, supra note 2, at 255 (explaining that "in Scalia, the so-called 'new
textualism' found the right person-brilliant, bold, and nothing if not persistent-at the right
place (the Supreme Court), at the right time, when there would be people to educate and
followers to lead among the Reagan-Bush appointees").
17. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 15, at 90.
18. See, e.g., In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook,
J.); SCALIA, supra note 1, at 29-37; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 987-91 (4th
ed. 2007) (describing the textualist critique of legislative history and collecting sources).
19. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 235-36 (describing the sources of guid-
ance used by textualists).
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meanings that remain after a thorough examination of the statute's "seman-
tic context." 20
The "intent skepticism" that underlies the new textualism is based in
part on the collective action problems facing an ongoing multi-member in-
stitution that were recognized by legal realists. 2' New textualists have also
relied, however, upon more recent lessons about the legislative process from
political science to underscore the difficulties of attributing a meaningful
intent to Congress beyond what is reflected by "the clear social meaning of
the enacted text."22 First, they invoke interest group theory to claim that
legislation is best understood as a fragile compromise between competing
private interests, rather than a single-minded effort to achieve its underlying
policy goals.23 Second, they rely upon Arrow's Paradox and other aspects
of social choice theory to argue that the preferences of individual represent-
atives cannot be aggregated into a coherent collective decision, and that
final legislative outcomes frequently turn on undetectable strategic or pro-
cedural variables. 24 Third, they rely upon proceduralist theories to emphas-
ize the array of hurdles that must be surmounted before a bill becomes a
law, and point out that a statute's language and its degree of specificity may
have been chosen "to clear the varied veto gates encountered along the way
to enactment." 25 The upshot is that because "the precise lines drawn by any
statute may reflect unrecorded compromises among interest groups, un-
knowable strategic behavior, or even an implicit legislative decision to fore-
go costly bargaining over greater textual precision," new textualists believe
that the only safe course for a faithful agent of Congress is to enforce the
clear terms of the statutes that have emerged from the legislative process.26
New textualists also claim that the judiciary's obligation to serve as a
faithful agent of Congress and treat "the clear social meaning of the enacted
text" as dispositive for purposes of statutory interpretation is compelled by
the Constitution.27 Specifically, they rely upon the requirements of bicame-
20. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM.
L. REv. 70 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides].
21. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863 (1930).
22. See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURv. AM. L. 33 (2006); Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2408.
23. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 15-16 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook,
The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARv. L. REV.
1328, 1346-47 (1994); Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2410-12.
24. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48
(1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains]; Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at
2412-13.
25. Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2417-18.
26. Id. at 2390.
27. See id. at 2431-45; Manning, Textualism, supra note 5, at 56-78; John F. Man-
ning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1999).
148 [Vol. 2009:143
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ralism and presentment to point out that only the statutory text, which was
formally approved by both chambers of Congress and the President, is au-
thoritative.28 Because this observation does not resolve which sources of
guidance may be used to interpret a statute's meaning, textualists have also
emphasized that the purpose of those safeguards is to impose a supermajori-
ty requirement on the legislative process that facilitates bargaining and the-
reby prevents the domination of otherwise vulnerable political minorities.29
By giving political minorities "exceptional power to block legislation as a
means of defense against self-interested majorities," the constitutional struc-
ture "makes it more crucial for interpreters to respect the lines of legislative
compromise," even if the resulting decisions might seem incoherent or un-
principled as a policy matter.o
Moreover, textualists rely upon judicial independence and the separa-
tion of legislative and judicial functions contemplated by the Constitution to
challenge the legitimacy of exercises of judicial discretion that deviate from
plain statutory meaning."' The theory is that if the legislature knows that it
will have no role in implementing the laws it enacts,32 Congress will be
more likely to craft bright-line rules that reduce the discretion of the execu-
tive and judicial officials who possess that authority." The enactment of
bright-line rules, rather than open-ended standards, will in turn promote the
advantages associated with the rule of law and reduce the potential for the
28. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not
by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: 'The law as it passed is the will of
the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself
. . . .') (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1844) (emphasis added by
Justice Scalia)); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 61, 68-69 (1994) ("No matter how well we can know the
wishes and desires of legislators, the only way the legislature issues binding commands is to
embed them in a law.") (emphasis omitted).
29. See Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2437; Manning, Textualism, supra note
5, at 74-78. See also John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM.
L. REv. 673 (1997) [hereinafter Manning, Nondelegation] (arguing that interpretive reliance
on legislative history creates an opportunity for legislative self-delegation, contrary to the
clear assumptions of the constitutional structure).
30. Manning, Textualism, supra note 5, at 76-78.
31. See Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, supra note 6, at 1022-28 (summarizing and
critiquing this argument).
32. According to some textualists, this principle explains the problem with authori-
tative use of legislative history by the judiciary in statutory interpretation. See Manning,
Nondelegation, supra note 29; SCALiA, supra note 1, at 35 (claiming that the legislative
powers that are authorized by the Constitution are nondelegable and that "Congress can no
more authorize one committee to 'fill in the details' of a particular law in a binding fashion
than it can authorize a committee to enact minor laws").
33. See Manning, Textualism, supra note 5, at 67-68.
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arbitrary exercise of discretionary authority.3 4 If Congress really wants to
provide preferential treatment for a favored interest, it will need to make
this decision explicit on the face of a statute, thereby promoting political
accountability." When courts interpret statutes contrary to their plain mean-
ing and thereby alter the plain scope of bright-line rules, the judiciary neces-
sarily undermines the Constitution's sophisticated process of reducing arbi-
trary decision making and promoting political accountability. 6
The new textualism's understanding of the legislative process and
constitutional structure is consistent with the rational basis test that is used
to assess the constitutional validity of ordinary legislation because this stan-
dard tolerates substantial legislative imprecision and limits judicial authority
to second-guess legislative directives. It is also consistent with a broader
jurisprudential preference for "the rule of law as a law of rules,"38 which
prizes law's externality and the related notion that we live under a govern-
ment of laws, and not of people." Indeed, the driving force behind the new
textualism appears to be an effort to make the law more objective and to
limit the policy discretion of unelected officials. 40 Although the same objec-
tives could be pursued solely for pragmatic reasons,41 the new textualism is
both powerful and distinctive precisely because of its claim that these goals
are required by a proper understanding of the legislative process and the
constitutional structure.
The new textualism has dramatic and controversial implications for
statutory interpretation. First, courts should not rely on legislative history to
ascertain Congress's intent in a particular case.42 Second, courts may not
consider a statute's underlying purpose to ascertain its meaning in a particu-
34. See Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2434-36. See also FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 98-99, 158-62 (1991) (describing the role of rules in allo-
cating power among institutions).
35. See Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2437.
36. See id. at 2434-37.
37. See id. at 2446-54.
38. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule ofLaw].
39. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is
the proud boast of our democracy that we have 'a government of laws and not of men."');
Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 349 (1992) ("Our
Constitution creates a government of laws and not of men.").
40. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1509, 1514 (1998).
41. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 1-4 (2006). Al-
though I have previously claimed that the absurdity doctrine and other equitable approaches
to statutory interpretation are justified on institutional grounds, see Staszewski, Avoiding
Absurdity, supra note 6, at 1043-64, the persuasiveness of exclusively pragmatic arguments
for textualism is beyond the scope of this Article.
42. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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lar case when the ordinary meaning of the enacted text is clear.43 Third, the
judiciary may not exercise equitable discretion to limit the reach of a sta-
tute's language to better achieve its underlying goals when unanticipated
problems arise." Finally, courts may not deviate from the plain meaning of
statutory language to avoid patently absurd results.45 Rather than challeng-
ing these conclusions, the next Part examines whether the theory underlying
the new textualism applies in the same manner to statutory interpretation by
the executive branch.
II. TEXTUALIST THEORY AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The rise of the new textualism has led legislation scholars to devote
renewed attention to the judiciary's proper role in statutory interpretation.
Meanwhile, administrative law scholars have been lavishing attention on the
level of deference that the judiciary should provide to statutory interpreta-
tion by administrative agencies.46 This is an important question because
regulatory agencies and other executive officials are the primary interpreters
of statutes in the modem regulatory state. Nonetheless, public law scholars
have only recently begun to ask how the executive branch does and should
carry out this task. Although a negative answer appears to be almost un-
iversally presumed, no one has specifically examined whether the primary
theoretical justifications for the new textualism apply to the executive
branch.47 This Part explains that they do.
First, the new textualism's legislative-process critique of the concept
of legislative intent applies with full force to statutory interpretation by ad-
ministrative agencies and other executive branch officials. The simple rea-
son for this conclusion is that these particular arguments for textualism fo-
cus on the alleged nature of the legislative process, rather than on the identi-
ty or characteristics of the officials who are subsequently exercising inter-
43. See Manning, What Divides, supra note 20, at 84 (explaining that when at least
two linguistically plausible meanings remain after thoroughly examining a statute's semantic
context, "textualists think it quite appropriate to resolve that ambiguity in light of the sta-
tute's apparent overall purpose"); SCALIA, supra note 1, at 20 ("Well of course I think that
the act was within the letter of the statute, and was therefore within the statute: end of
case."). See also Molot, supra note 3, at 45 (describing the limited circumstances in which
aggressive textualists will consider policy consequences and statutory purposes).
44. See Manning, Textualism, supra note 5.
45. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
46. See Mashaw, supra note 9, at 501 ("Since Chevron v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, forests have been laid waste to publish the outpouring of legal commentary on
that decision and its progeny.") (citation omitted).
47. Judge Easterbrook and Michael Herz have, however, thoughtfully addressed the
tension between textualism and the Chevron doctrine. See Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion,
supra note 8; Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice
Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1663 (1991).
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pretive authority. Thus, the collective action problems of an ongoing multi-
member institution will continue to exist regardless of who is implementing
the final legislative product. The same is true of interest-group bargaining,
the difficulties of aggregating majoritarian preferences, the prevalence of
strategic and procedural maneuvering, and the need to frame legislation in a
manner that enables it to overcome veto-gates. The upshot, once again, is
that because "the precise lines drawn by any statute may reflect unrecorded
compromises among interest groups, unknowable strategic behavior, or
even an implicit legislative decision to forego costly bargaining over greater
textual precision," the only safe course for a faithful agent of Congress is to
enforce the clear terms of the statutes that have emerged from the legislative
process.48
For the same reason, the implications of bicameralism and present-
ment for statutory interpretation by the judiciary should also apply when
this task is performed by agencies and other executive branch officials. The
statutory text is the only authoritative source of law that can emerge from
the legislative process regardless of who is interpreting it. Moreover, the
concessions that political minorities were able to secure in the legislative
process as a result of these structural safeguards should presumably be res-
pected by the executive branch as well as by the judiciary. If the goal of
bicameralism and presentment is to facilitate bargaining and prevent the
domination of otherwise vulnerable political minorities by majority factions
in the legislative process,49 the constitutional structure should compel all
subsequent interpreters to "respect the lines of legislative compromise" that
are reflected in the final legislative product.
Third, the incentives for the legislative enactment of bright-line rules
and efforts to facilitate congressional accountability that are allegedly fos-
tered by the separation of governmental functions could not be maintained if
agencies and other executive branch officials ignored the text is of statutes.
In other words, if the Constitution is designed to encourage Congress to
enact bright-line rules to promote the advantages of the rule of law and re-
duce the potential for arbitrary exercises of discretionary authority, those
goals would be undermined at least as much if the executive branch was
permitted to deviate from the plain meaning of statutory commands as they
would be if this authority was granted to the judiciary."o Although adminis-
48. Cf supra note 26 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
50. Indeed, Professor Manning's historical evidence for this claim refers explicitly
to the separation of functions between the legislative and executive branches, rather than
between the legislative and judicial branches. See Manning, Textualism, supra note 5, at 67,
77 & n.267 (claiming "[s]o long as the legislature retained control over the law's executors,
it would more likely enact vague laws leaving broad discretion to those who applied them,"
and explaining that "[slince the concept of executive power had traditionally included judi-
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HeinOnline -- 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 152 2009
Textualism and the Executive Branch
trative agencies in particular are not exempt from subsequent congressional
influence, this distinction from the judiciary would seem to cut in favor of
limiting their discretionary authority to deviate from clear statutory man-
dates for purposes of promoting congressional accountability. If the con-
cern is that Congress could otherwise enact generally applicable rules and
subsequently pressure (or allow) officials who are responsible for imple-
menting the law to exempt favored interests without facing any political
accountability for those decisions, this is a far greater danger in the regula-
tory process than it is within the judiciary." The realization of this concern
is, in fact, a familiar part of the story of "regulatory capture."
For the foregoing reasons, the theoretical arguments for the new tex-
tualism that are based on the legislative process and constitutional structure
apply with full force to statutory interpretation by administrative agencies
and other executive branch officials. The broader jurisprudential concerns
that underlie this theory would seem to apply to executive branch statutory
interpretation as well. Simply put, an effort to promote objectivity in the
law and limit the discretionary authority of unelected officials would be
furthered by requiring administrators and most other executive branch offi-
cials to adhere to the plain meaning of statutory text when they exercise
delegated authority.52 The only major theoretical argument for textualism
that does not apply seamlessly to executive branch statutory interpretation
involves the permissive nature of the rational basis test that is used by courts
to assess the constitutional validity of ordinary legislation," and the implica-
tions of this argument outside of the judicial context are highly ambiguous.54
cial functions, many writings of this era use the term 'executor' to include judges") (citing
W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 5 (1965)) (emphasis added).
51. For further development of this point, see infra notes 108-113, 159-164 and
accompanying text.
52. The lone possible exception to this principle would be when delegated statutory
authority is exercised personally by the President. For a discussion of the potential role of
his political accountability in distinguishing the appropriate methodology of statutory inter-
pretation by the executive branch, see infra Part IV.
53. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
54. Cf Mashaw, supra note 9, at 507-10 (considering the applicability of the
"avoidance canon" to statutory interpretation by executive agencies and claiming that
"[c]onstitutionally timid administration both compromises faithful agency and potentially
usurps the role of the judiciary in harmonizing congressional power and constitutional com-
mand"); Morrison, supra note 10 (evaluating the applicability of the avoidance canon to
executive branch statutory interpretation and concluding that this question turns on the theo-
retical justification for the canon and whether the statute is deemed ambiguous by an agency
with a superior understanding of the underlying statutory purpose). As Mashaw points out,
the complexity of this question stems partly from the fact that an agency is typically respon-
sible for interpreting statutes and is potentially subject to judicial review. Because most
statutory classifications are upheld under the rational basis test, agencies should presumably
not worry about the constitutional validity of ordinary legislative classifications when they
interpret statutes. On the other hand, to the extent that the permissive nature of the rational
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In sum, textualism is based on specific understandings of legislation
and the need to impose limitations on the implementation of the law by un-
elected officials in other branches of government. It should therefore follow
inescapably from this perspective that administrative agencies and other
executive branch officials should interpret statutes in a textualist fashion."
Thus, under textualist theory, agencies and other executive officials should
not rely on legislative history to ascertain Congress's intent. 6 Moreover,
agencies and other executive officials should not consider a statute's under-
lying purpose when the semantic meaning of its text is clear or exercise
equitable discretion to limit a statute's reach to better achieve its underlying
goals when unanticipated problems arise." Finally, agencies and other ex-
ecutive officials should not deviate from the plain meaning of statutory lan-
guage to avoid patently absurd results." Not only are the foregoing proposi-
tions inconsistent with the conventional wisdom and existing practice, but
the next Part explains that even the most firmly committed textualists do not
believe that administrative agencies and other executive branch officials are
required to implement statutes in a textualist fashion.
III. TEXTUALISTS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
It is widely recognized that textualists tend to be fans of the executive
branch of government." They have therefore enthusiastically embraced
basis test is understood as a limitation on judicial authority, see Manning, Absurdity, supra
note 7, at 2446-54, agencies could potentially exercise greater discretion than courts to refine
imprecise statutory classifications in ways that deviate from the plain meaning of statutory
text.
55. Advocates of the unitary executive theory might object to my treatment of agen-
cy heads and other subordinate executive officials as "unelected" on the grounds that all of
their decisions could be attributed to the President. Not only is this position unrealistic, but it
blinks away the fundamental problem of legitimacy of the modem regulatory state. I there-
fore believe that it is appropriate to treat unelected public officials as unelected for purposes
of this analysis. See infra Part IV (claiming that the alleged political accountability of the
President and administrative agencies does not justify unconstrained executive discretion).
56. For a non-textualist argument to the contrary, see Strauss, supra note 11.
57. For a documentation and defense of the contrary practice, see Alfred C. Aman,
Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DuKE
L.J. 277 (1982).
58. For a non-textualist argument to the contrary, see Cass R. Sunstein, Avoiding
Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11, 126 (2002).
59. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L.
REv. 1505, 1533 (2008) ("Justice Scalia's argument for restricting standing is part and parcel
of his more general argument for expanded presidential power, [including] the power to
change public policy through deliberate nonenforcement of law."); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1334 (1990) (claiming that "part of the tex-
tualist agenda is enhanced executive power at the expense of the other branches-
particularly the judicial branch").
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legal theories and doctrines that shift authority from the judiciary to admin-
istrative agencies and the President. Because textualism is also portrayed as
a broad limitation on judicial authority, the way in which textualists have
understood the proper roles of the judiciary and the executive branch has
struck most commentators as perfectly coherent. The reality, however, is
that these doctrines and theories allow the executive branch to implement
statutes in a (non-textualist) manner that is virtually certain to undermine
countless legislative deals. Accordingly, there is considerable tension be-
tween textualist theory and the administrative-law and related separation-of-
powers jurisprudence that is endorsed by leading textualists.
The most obvious way that textualists allow the executive branch to
ignore the plain meaning of statutory language is by maintaining that deci-
sions not to enforce the law are "generally committed to an agency's abso-
lute discretion," and therefore presumptively immune from judicial re-
view.60 While neither Justice Scalia nor Judge Easterbrook was on the Su-
preme Court that decided Heckler v. Chaney,"1 they have both strongly em-
braced this principle on the grounds that an agency's decisions regarding
whether and how to enforce most statutes are political judgments that are
inevitably based on the resolution of competing interests.62 Because courts
are not in a good position to know "what else" an agency has been assigned
to do with its limited resources, discretionary policy decisions to "do noth-
ing" about a particular problem are none of the judiciary's business." Jus-
tice Scalia has therefore candidly declared, for example, that "[e]stablishing
environmental requirements is one thing; enforcing them is something
else."'
60. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
61. Then-Judge Scalia did, however, dissent from the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that
the non-enforcement decision was subject to judicial review and that the agency's decision
was arbitrary and capricious on the merits. See Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1192
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. See Frank H. Easterbrook, On Not Enforcing the Law, REGULATION 14-16
(Jan./Feb. 1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Not Enforcing]; Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of
Regulatory Agencies Under Environmental Laws, 24 Hous. L. REV. 97, 104-09 (1987) [he-
reinafter Scalia, Responsibilities]; Antonin Scalia, The Role ofthe Judiciary in Deregulation,
55 ANTITRUST L.J. 191 (1986) [hereinafter Scalia, Role ofJudiciary].
63. See Scalia, Role ofJudiciary, supra note 62, at 192-96. See also Easterbrook,
Not Enforcing, supra note 62, at 15-16 ("Prosecutorial discretion is as much part of 'the law'
as any other rule," and "[miaking the most of a budget sometimes requires enforcers to make
selective changes in the contours of the legal rules they have been handed by Congress.").
64. See Scalia, Responsibilities, supra note 62, at 105. For an example of Justice
Scalia putting this principle into practice, see Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,
542 U.S. 55, 65-67 (2004) (holding that the Bureau of Land Management's failure to prohibit
off-road vehicles in certain wilderness study areas in alleged violation of its statutory duty to
manage those areas so as not to impair their suitability for preservation as wilderness was not
subject to judicial review because "[t]he prospect of pervasive oversight by federal courts
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Textualists also advocate relatively strict limitations on standing to
protect the executive branch's political decisions regarding how and wheth-
er to implement federal regulatory programs. Justice Scalia has argued that
such limitations on standing should be understood as an essential element of
the separation of powers that preclude the judiciary from interfering with
the policy choices of the executive." His theory is that the judicial role
should be limited to protecting the vested legal rights of specific individuals
from deprivation by the political branches of government.6 His opinions
have therefore consistently sought to prevent regulatory beneficiaries from
pursuing "generalized grievances" against the executive branch based on its
alleged failure to comply with the terms of regulatory statutes, even when
Congress has explicitly authorized such adjudication." In the absence of an
"injury in fact," the executive branch would therefore be free to ignore the
plain meaning of numerous statutory provisions.68
A stated benefit of preventing judicial interference with the executive
branch's political discretion is that previously enacted statutory mandates
that no longer command majority support can be rendered obsolete. Justice
Scalia openly acknowledges that the foregoing limitations on judicial re-
view would mean that "important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls
over the manner and pace of agency compliance with such congressional directives is not
contemplated by the APA").
65. See Scalia, supra note 12; Antonin Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L.
REV. xxv (1982) [hereinafter Scalia, Rulemaking]; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 577 (1982) (Scalia, J.) ("To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated
public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vin-
dicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithful-
ly executed."' (quoting U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3)).
66. See Scalia, supra note 12, at 894-97.
67. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 29-
30 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judi-
cially-Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DuKE L.J. 1170, 1200-01 (1993) ("The broad
reasoning of the majority opinion would ... yield a holding that federal courts lack jurisdic-
tion to enforce [a] clear and explicit congressional policy decision because no agency viola-
tion of the statute can produce a cognizable form of injury through a cognizable causal se-
quence."). Cf Scalia, Rulemaking, supra note 65, at xxvi (explaining that ripeness and
standing doctrines traditionally "enabled many rules to be issued with the practical assurance
that they would never be subject to the rational, nonpolitical scrutiny of the courts"). At
times, Justice Scalia appears to suggest that his approach would not allow agencies to deviate
from unambiguous statutory mandates, see id. at xxx (claiming that "there is no room for
political accommodation or the application of unanalytic value judgment in the Food and
Drug Administration's implementation of the Delaney Amendment, which requires the ban-
ning of food additives that have been shown to cause cancer in animals"), but he has also
recognized that "if all persons who could conceivably raise a particular issue are excluded
[from seeking judicial review], the issue is excluded as well." Scalia, supra note 12, at 892.
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of Congress, [could] be lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the feder-
al bureaucracy."69 He sees this as a positive development, however, because
"[t]he ability to lose or misdirect laws can be said to be one of the prime
engines of social change.""o Judge Easterbrook has likewise argued that
changes in the law can be legitimately initiated outside of the legislative
process by public officials who have been delegated the authority to imple-
ment regulatory programs." Thus, when it comes to the executive branch's
role in implementing the law, leading textualists have a tendency to become
advocates of "dynamic statutory interpretation."72
This tendency is apparent in the texualists' wholehearted embrace of
the Chevron doctrine." Chevron famously held that courts and agencies
must both follow Congress's intent when it explicitly resolved an issue that
later arises in statutory interpretation, but that the judiciary must defer to
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions by administra-
tive agencies.74 Justice Scalia has explained that one of Chevron's "major
advantages from the standpoint of governmental theory . . . is to permit
needed flexibility, and appropriate political participation, in the administra-
tive process."" In contrast, "[o]ne of the major disadvantages of having the
courts resolve ambiguities is that they resolve them for ever and ever; only
statutory amendment can produce a change."" He has, therefore, con-
cluded:
If Congress is to delegate broadly, as modem times are thought to demand, it
seems to me desirable that the delegee be able to suit its actions to the times and
that continuing political accountability be assured, through direct political pres-
sures upon the Executive and through the indirect political pressure of congres-
sional oversight.7 7
Similarly, Judge Easterbrook has pointed out that one practical advan-
tage of delegating interpretive authority to agencies is that this practice "ex-
69. Scalia, supra note 12, at 897.
70. Id.
71. See Easterbrook, Not Enforcing, supra note 62, at 16. See also Easterbrook,
Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 7-8 (describing how "delegation expedites change").
72. Cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DuKE L.J. 511 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Judicial Deference]; Easterbrook, Judicial
Discretion, supra note 8, at 1.
74. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
75. Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 73, at 517.
76. Id. This proposition was recently rejected by the Supreme Court over Justice
Scalia's vigorous dissent. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967 (2005).
77. Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 73, at 518.
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pedites change" by allowing regulators to make necessary adjustments to
the governing law in response to changed political circumstances or tech-
nical considerations "without the need for contentious debate in Con-
gress."" The conferral of this discretionary authority on agencies is appro-
priate because in contrast to the federal judiciary, "Congress and the Presi-
dent can control bureaucrats" through their oversight and removal powers.79
Commentators have previously recognized that textualism and Che-
vron are in tension with one another on several different levels.o First,
there is no textual authority for the Chevron doctrine," and the plain mean-
ing of the APA suggests that courts are to resolve issues of statutory inter-
pretation de novo.82 Second, Chevron adopts a fundamentally different un-
derstanding of the process of statutory interpretation than does textualism."
A textualist judge constructs a single correct answer to a statutory problem
based on the plain meaning of the text in context and, at least in the absence
of an authoritative administrative interpretation, definitively resolves any
remaining ambiguity.84 Meanwhile, however, agencies are free to adopt any
"reasonable" interpretation when the statute is ambiguous. Texualist inter-
pretation by a court is decidedly static because the court's obligation is to
construe the statute's plain meaning at the time of enactment and its deci-
sions are binding on other courts and executive branch officials "for ever
and ever."" Meanwhile, agency statutory interpretation under Chevron is
properly dynamic. Indeed, while "policymaking" by courts is anathema to
modern textualism, Chevron expressly declared that "an agency to which
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibility may, within the limits
of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views
of wise policy to inform its judgments."" Chevron is therefore widely un-
78. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 7-8.
79. See id. at 8.
80. See generally id. at 1; Herz, supra note 47, at 1663.
81. See Herz, supra note 47, at 1664-67.
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (providing that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, . . . [and shall] hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . [or] in excess
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right"). Ironically,
when Justice Scalia has attempted to square Chevron with the Court's traditional practice, he
has relied upon the legislative history of the APA. See Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note
73, at 512-13.
83. See Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 2-4; Herz, supra note 47,
at 1668-72.
84. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
85. See supra text accompanying note 76.
86. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984).
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derstood, for better or for worse, to have candidly equated the resolution of
statutory ambiguity with "policymaking."87
It is possible, of course, to square Chevron's analytical framework
with a textualist interpretive methodology if Chevron's respective steps are
understood and applied in a certain way. Specifically, step one could be
used to ascertain the plain meaning of the statutory text in its semantic con-
text. Step two would therefore only be reached in relatively unusual cir-
cumstances when two or more textually plausible interpretations remained
after this inquiry or when Congress delegated extremely broad authority to
an agency to promote the public interest in a particular area. Finally, the
"reasonableness" inquiry under step two would be quite forgiving, especial-
ly in the latter scenario." Justice Scalia has, in fact, suggested something
along these lines when he explained Chevron's underlying appeal to textual-
ists:
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from
its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the
triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that
Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I
would not personally adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a "plain meaning" rule,
and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the
legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will
discern a much broader range of "reasonable" interpretation that the agency may
adopt and to which the courts must pay deference. The frequency with which Che-
vron will require that judge to accept an interpretation he thinks wrong is infinitely
greater.89
There are, however, some limitations on this explanation that prevent
it from completely eliminating the tension between Chevron and the new
textualism. First, textualists do not always follow this approach when they
review the legality of an agency's interpretive decisions.o In this regard,
neither Chevron nor Mead involved the interpretation of statutory provi-
sions that ordinary applications of the textualist methodology would deem
87. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Imagining the Past; Remembering the Future, 1991
DuKEL.J. 711, 713 (1991).
88. Indeed, the entire step two inquiry is difficult to square with textualist theory.
See Herz, supra note 47, at 1670 ("The step two inquiry into the 'reasonableness' of the
agency's interpretation seems to go beyond the limits of the textualist inquiry.").
89. Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 73, at 521 (emphasis omitted). There is
some empirical support for Justice Scalia's analysis. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Suns-
tein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Cm.
L. REv. 823, 831-32 (2006) (finding that Justice Scalia is the least deferential justice in Che-
vron cases).
90. See Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In
Defense ofJustice Scalia, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 393, 421-22 (1996) (claiming that Justice Scalia
self-consciously relaxes his usual textualist methodology in Chevron cases).
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"ambiguous." 9 1 Moreover, the fundamental importance that textualists
attribute to the Chevron doctrine would be lost if the judiciary's deference
to administrative interpretations of statutes was so narrowly limited. When
agencies implement broad delegations of authority to regulate in the public
interest, their policy decisions are reviewed by courts under the arbitrary
and capricious standard because they are not ordinarily understood as the
product of "statutory interpretation."92 The other form of "ambiguity" that
is recognized by textualism involves situations where two or more textually
plausible interpretations remain after a thorough examination of a statute's
semantic context." Textualists would otherwise resolve the ambiguity in
those situations by considering the underlying purposes of the statute and
other policy consequences." Thus, deference to reasonable agency interpre-
tations is entirely sensible and non-controversial in those situations solely
for pragmatic reasons. It is therefore difficult to see why the Chevron doc-
trine is so sacrosanct to textualists, and more specifically, why judicial defe-
rence to reasonable agency interpretations is thought to require a shift in
interpretive authority from courts to agencies.
Leading textualists have emphasized, however, that Chevron is justi-
fied by a fictional presumption that Congress intends to delegate interpre-
tive authority to resolve statutory ambiguity to administrative agencies ra-
ther than courts." They have also suggested that the scope of statutory am-
biguity may be broader under Chevron than it would be under ordinary ap-
plications of the textualist methodology. As Justice Scalia has explained:
If Chevron is to have any meaning, then, congressional intent must be regarded as
"ambiguous" not just when no interpretation is even marginally better than any
91. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 224-25 (2001) (explaining that
the interpretive issue was whether day planners were "diaries . . . bound" under the relevant
legal provision); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 (explaining that the validity of the EPA's regula-
tion turned on whether an existing plant that contains several pollution-emitting devices is a
"new or modified major stationary source" of air pollution under the Clean Air Act).
92. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. ("State Farm"), 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
93. See Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2463 (claiming that statutory ambigui-
ty only exists from a textualist perspective when "a given phrase has several relevant social
connotations"); see also Manning, What Divides, supra note 20 (distinguishing textualism
from purposivism on the grounds that textualists emphasize semantic context over policy
context and vice versa).
94. See Manning, What Divides, supra note 20, at 84-85 (explaining that "when a
statute is ambiguous, textualists think it quite appropriate to resolve that ambiguity in light of
the statute's apparent overall purpose").
95. See Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 73, at 516-17. See also Easterbrook,
Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 5-6 (claiming that Chevron deference is based on the
principle that "Congress may delegate a law-making power to the Executive Branch, whose
decisions must be respected because they are ultimately political"); Krzalic v. Republic Title
Co., 314 F.3d 875, 882-84 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("Agencies' interpre-
tive role stems from delegation of authority, not raw ambiguity.").
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other, but rather when two or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally va-
lid, interpretations exist. This is indeed intimated by the opinion in Chevron-
which suggests that the opposite of "ambiguity" is not "resolvability" but rather
"clarity." "
Thus, regardless of precisely when textualists will find a statute ambiguous
and move to the second step of the analysis, they ultimately seem to favor
the Chevron doctrine because it shifts interpretive authority from the judi-
ciary to administrative agencies and the executive branch.
One consequence of expanding the scope of statutory ambiguity and
shifting interpretive authority from the judiciary to agencies is that the pre-
vailing interpretive methodology will change in a certain range of cases. If
a textualist court would otherwise resolve an issue in a particular way based
on the plain meaning of the statute in context, and an agency was expected
to follow the same methodological approach to the question, there would be
no reason for the judiciary to defer to the agency's conclusion. Judge Eas-
terbrook has therefore persuasively explained that Chevron's true impor-
tance for a textualist lies in the fact that "[a] judge who announces deference
is approving a shift in interpretive method' because "[e]verything an agency
is likely to rely on-political pressure, the President's view of happy out-
comes, cost-benefit studies, legislative history (including letters or tongue-
lashings from members of Congress, as well as the committee reports), and
the other tools of policy wonks-is off limits to textualist judges."" In oth-
er words, Chevron only makes sense for a textualist if agencies are not ex-
pected to interpret statutes in a textualist fashion."
One consequence of shifting the prevailing interpretive methodology
in this range of cases will be to shift policymaking authority from the enact-
ing Congress and the legislative branch to administrative agencies and the
executive branch. This is true because, other things being equal, the judi-
ciary is more likely than executive branch agencies to respect the original
legislative deal, irrespective of contemporary political preferences.99 There
may be good reasons to endorse dynamic statutory interpretation, but they
should not be compelling to a textualist who purportedly believes that legis-
lation is a fragile compromise between competing private interests that
should be enforced by a faithful agent according to its plain terms. At the
end of the day, Chevron conflicts with textualism because it increases the
likelihood that public officials who are responsible for implementing the
law will deviate from the "deals" that were enacted by the legislature.
96. See Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 73, at 520.
97. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 3 (emphasis added).
98. See id.; Herz, supra note 47, at 1673-74.
99. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875 (1975); see also Herz, supra note 47, at
1667-68 ("The political result reflected in the statute will more likely be respected by neutral
courts than by accountable, politically appointed agencies.").
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Perhaps ironically, textualists have sought to justify these potential
deviations from previous legislative deals based on Congress's presumed
intent and a variety of other policy considerations. Aside from the fact that
this mode of justification poses conflicts with their jurisprudential method,
there are good reasons to question whether Congress would endorse a pre-
sumption that equates statutory ambiguity with a delegation of interpretive
authority to executive branch agencies. First, as explained above, adminis-
trative agencies are more likely than the federal judiciary to deviate from
the original statutory deal based on new developments or political consider-
ations." While a legislature with sincere policy objectives might welcome
an agency's potential ability to make a statutory scheme more effective in
the face of changed circumstances, this could be accomplished by a doctrine
of judicial respect for the well-considered views of agencies in resolving
statutory ambiguity. 0 ' Moreover, the self-interested Congress that is envi-
sioned by textualism would presumably be more concerned about preserv-
ing the sanctity of its own directives and constraining executive discre-
tion.102 A legislature that hoped to achieve its policy objectives or preserve
the sanctity of its own directives would also be concerned about potential
disobedience or back-sliding by the executive branch in response to political
opposition. These observations are especially true when the President is a
member of a political party different from that of the enacting Congress,
which has routinely been the case in contemporary American politics.o3
100. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance ofPower in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452,
474-76 (1989) (explaining that Landes's and Posner's "analysis implies that at least with
respect to important questions of statutory meaning-those terms of the legislative 'deal' that
would have mattered to the original bargainers--Congress typically intends the court rather
than the agency to control interpretation," but claiming that "we have little basis for divining
with any acceptable degree of confidence the legislature's 'typical' expectation regarding the
role of courts and agencies in determining statutory meaning"); Jonathan T. Molot, Reex-
amining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense ofJudi-
cial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1239, 1279-80 (2002) ("One
need not share Landes and Posner's understanding of the legislative process as a forum for
interest group bargaining to see that subjecting legislative enactments to revision in the ad-
ministrative process would undermine the Constitution's careful allocation of legislative
authority among Representatives, Senators, and the President.").
101. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
102. Some legislators may want to enact ineffective legislation to earn political credit
from voters and avoid the costs to regulated entities that would result from faithful executive
branch enforcement. Any theory of public law that affirmatively sought to facilitate this
behavior would, however, be normatively problematic.
103. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not so Independent Agencies: Party Polari-
zation and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REv. 459, 486 (2008) ("Divided
government, relatively unusual before 1955, has become the norm over the past fifty
years.").
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Because the Chevron doctrine is based on a presumption that Congress
wants the judiciary to defer to reasonable administrative interpretations of
ambiguous statutes, it is widely understood that Congress could reverse or
overcome this presumption by enacting legislation to the contrary.'" Yet,
this course of action would significantly raise the costs of legislation and
might not be successful, or even worth the effort, given the possibility of a
presidential veto. Since the explicit goals of modem textualism include
establishing a stable interpretative framework for Congress to legislate
against and avoiding the judiciary's imposition of its own subjective policy
preferences onto the law,' it is vital for courts to adopt accurate default
rules under this perspective. If Congress would most likely prefer the judi-
ciary to maintain interpretive authority over the resolution of statutory am-
biguities, the fact that it could potentially achieve this result with further
legislation does not eliminate the tension between Chevron and the new
textualism.
One potential objection to the preceding analysis would be that it fo-
cuses unduly on Congress's likely intentions with respect to the relatively
small number of statutes that it enacts during a legislative session. Al-
though Congress presumably wants agencies and courts to respect the deals
that it enacts into law, it may be willing to give up some influence over the
future resolution of ambiguities in those statutes in exchange for greater
control over the present interpretation of ambiguous provisions in the rest of
the United States Code. Einer Elhauge has persuasively argued that Che-
vron deference is consistent with rational legislative preferences because it
incorporates this tradeoff and increases the likelihood that an agency's poli-
cy decisions will reflect the "current enactable preferences" of lawmakers.'
Leading textualists have not expressly evaluated Professor Elhauge's
intriguing theory, but it explicitly assumes that administrative interpreta-
tions of ambiguous statutory provisions are significantly influenced by leg-
islative oversight and ordinarily reflect a broad consensus among members
of the executive branch and Congress. Regardless of the accuracy of these
104. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2637 (2003). As
indicated above, some would argue that Congress has already done so in the APA. See supra
notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
105. Cf Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2465-68 (explaining that "modem
textualists unflinchingly rely on legal conventions that instruct courts, in recurrent circums-
tances, to supplement the bare text with established qualifications designed to advance cer-
tain substantive policies," and claiming that "[t]hese background conventions, if sufficiently
firmly established, may be considered part of the interpretive environment in which Congress
acts").
106. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM.
L. REv. 2027 (2002).
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propositions,o' the ability of legislators to influence the meaning of statutes
outside of the formal lawmaking process is in severe tension with textualist
theory.
In this regard, John Manning has explained that textualism is based
upon structural constitutional norms that preclude legislators from exercis-
ing control over the manner in which statutes are implemented unless they
overcome the hurdles of bicameralism and presentment.' Judicial reliance
upon legislative history as authoritative evidence of legislative intent alle-
gedly violates this mandate because it allows certain members of Congress
to speak for the entire body on questions that were not explicitly resolved by
the plain meaning of the text that was enacted. Although courts may admit-
tedly consult dictionaries, judicial precedent, and other extrinsic sources of
statutory meaning that were not adopted pursuant to the constitutionally-
mandated lawmaking procedures, they cannot adopt interpretive practices
that allow Congress to delegate law-elaboration authority to its own mem-
bers without violating principles of separated powers.
From this perspective, a justification for Chevron deference that is
based on Congress's desire to increase its control over contemporary inter-
pretations of the ambiguous provisions of every existing statute would be
highly problematic. First, legislative oversight could be used to pressure or
persuade agencies to adopt interpretations that fail to reflect the current
enactable preferences of lawmakers. Moreover, even when legislative over-
sight succeeds in pressuring or persuading agencies to adopt interpretations
that do reflect current enactable preferences, elected lawmakers should pre-
sumably be required to go through the constitutional motions.
One could attempt to distinguish the judiciary's use of legislative his-
tory in statutory interpretation from legislative oversight regarding the man-
ner in which agencies implement the law on a couple of related bases. First,
congressional influence over agency statutory interpretation is not "authori-
tative" in the same sense as judicial use of legislative history because in the
former context, officials outside of Congress are ultimately making the final
decision. Second, agencies frequently implement statutes pursuant to no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking procedures that arguably promote the under-
lying goals of bicameralism and presentment." Accordingly, there is noth-
ing wrong with members of Congress seeking to influence how agencies
interpret statutes, so long as the applicable APA provisions are satisfied.
The first distinction is questionable as a formal matter because even
when the judiciary relies upon legislative history to interpret statutes, offi-
107. For reasons described below, if the first assumption is true, and the second is
not, then Elhauge's theory becomes even more problematic from the perspective of textualist
theory.
108. See Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 29.
109. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706.
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cials outside of Congress (namely, judges) ultimately make the final deci-
sion. From a practical standpoint, moreover, legislative influence or pres-
sure could become "authoritative" (in the sense of proving dispositive) if an
agency's budgetary resources or other favorable treatment was conditioned
upon its willingness to implement existing statutes in the manner preferred
by the relevant congressional committees. Because the statements and ac-
tions of legislative committees are typically more visible and transparent
and subject to more effective safeguards in the context of enacting legisla-
tion than they are in the context of overseeing subsequent regulatory beha-
vior, congressional oversight of existing regulatory programs should be
more problematic from a textualist perspective than judicial reliance upon
legislative history in statutory interpretation."o
The second distinction, which suggests that administrative procedures
can "cure" an otherwise problematic delegation of policymaking authority
to administrative agencies,'" implies a very different approach to adminis-
trative law from what is usually favored by textualists. From this perspec-
tive, agencies should only receive Chevron deference if their interpretive
decisions were the product of notice and comment rulemaking or other rela-
tively formal procedures. Second, the discretionary policy choices that are
made by agencies pursuant to broad delegations of authority should be sub-
ject to hard-look judicial review to ensure that they engaged in reasoned
decision making. Third, the concern with undue congressional influence
over agency decision making could be addressed in part by prohibiting ex
parte contacts between legislators and agency officials during the rulemak-
ing process or by requiring those communications to be disclosed in the
administrative record. Yet, leading textualists tend to be the most vocal
critics of the judiciary's decisions in Mead, State Farm, and HBO, the ca-
nonical administrative law cases that respectively endorsed the foregoing
doctrines." 2 Thus, at the end of the day, a serious tension remains between
110. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Ex-
ecutive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 50-55 (1994) (claiming that congressional oversight threatens
the President's ability to execute the laws faithfully).
111. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1996). See also Glen Staszewski,
Rejecting the Myth ofPopular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democ-
racy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 443-47 (2003) (claiming that APA procedures and hard-look
judicial review promote reasoned deliberation in the administrative process and thereby
compensate for the absence of representation and bicameralism and presentment).
112. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 239, 261 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(dissenting "even more vigorously from the reasoning that produces the Court's judgment,"
and opining that the decision is "one of the most significant opinions ever rendered by the
Court dealing with the judicial review of administrative action" and that "[i]ts consequences
will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad"); JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: A HAMILTONIAN ON THE SUPREME COURT 22 (2006) ("Over the
years, Scalia has been a sharp critic of 'hard-look' scrutiny by courts in reviewing the factual
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textualist theory and the administrative law doctrines that are favored by
textualists, including a very broad scope for Chevron's domain."'
A similar analysis would apply to the judiciary's adoption of a pre-
sumption against judicial review of non-enforcement decisions under the
APA. The most plausible way to square this decision with textualism is to
resort to the notion that since either Congress or an agency can overcome
this presumption by codifying their enforcement priorities, the Court has
merely established a default rule that lawmakers intend to provide agencies
with unfettered enforcement discretion."4 In this regard, the enforcement
provisions of many regulatory statutes are written in discretionary terms."'
Moreover, Judge Easterbrook has pointed out that some statutes are only
enacted because some legislators anticipate that their provisions will never
be fully enforced." 6 Finally, Congress treats the appropriation of funds,
which is a precondition of law enforcement, as a distinct matter from the
substantive rules of law that an agency is charged with implementing."'
Accordingly, Congress may understand enforcement as a distinctive policy
sphere, which is unrelated to the substantive meaning of the laws that it has
enacted.
and policy determinations of administrative agencies."); Scalia, Role ofJudiciary, supra note
62, at 196-97 (endorsing the D.C. Circuit's refusal to invalidate a legislative rule based on
undisclosed ex parte contacts in Sierra Club v. Costle, and claiming that "if you thought that
[the] formula [at issue] was scientifically arrived at and was not the product of a political
compromise between the high-sulphur states and the low-sulphur states, you believe in Santa
Claus").
113. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833 (2001) (coining this term).
114. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 833, 833, 838 (1984) (establishing a presump-
tion against judicial review of an agency's non-enforcement decisions that can be overcome
"where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising
its enforcement powers," and emphasizing that it was "essentially leav[ing] to Congress, and
not to the courts, the decision as to whether an agency's refusal to institute proceedings
should be judicially reviewable").
115. This consideration may provide the strongest basis for squaring broad enforce-
ment discretion with textualism. On the other hand, textualists have a tendency to resist the
conclusion that seemingly mandatory statutory language eliminates absolute enforcement
discretion. See Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1196 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that "[m]ost of
the criminal code is cast in . . . mandatory terms, and yet prosecutors' discretion not to indict
is the archetype of unreviewable enforcement discretion"). Their resistance to citizen-suit
provisions also demonstrates that textualists would prefer to limit Congress's ability to re-
strict the enforcement discretion of the executive branch. See supra note 67 and accompany-
ing text.
116. See Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 12 (providing an example
of this phenomenon).
117. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 18, at 448 (describing the distinction between
legislative authorizations and appropriations).
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The problem, once again, is not only that Congress has failed to adopt
this view explicitly,"' but that Congress would be unlikely to endorse a pre-
sumption that gives executive branch agencies unfettered discretion to ig-
nore a large percentage of its substantive mandates. During periods of di-
vided government, the majority party in Congress would presumably resist
handing over such a powerful tool to the leader of the opposing political
party. Even when a single party controls the executive and legislative
branches, political compromise would routinely be necessary for successful-
ly enacted legislation to overcome the hurdle of bicameralism. As indicated
above, one of the central goals of textualism is to establish interpretive rules
that facilitate bargaining by rendering the law's application more predicta-
ble. Yet, the adoption of a presumption that the executive has absolute en-
forcement discretion dramatically undermines this goal, if not rendering it
impossible. Moreover, the action needed to overcome this presumption
would significantly raise the transaction costs associated with enacting
meaningful legislation and face the possibility of a presidential veto. The
vocal opposition by members of Congress to President George W. Bush's
use of "signing statements" to express his disagreement with certain statuto-
ry provisions and instruct executive branch agencies not to enforce those
provisions strongly supports the conclusion that Congress does not have a
meta-intent to give the executive branch absolute discretion to refuse to
implement its legal mandates."'
This is not to say that Congress wants stringent judicial review of
every non-enforcement decision. Rather, the question is whether Congress
would prefer a default rule that gives agencies absolute enforcement discre-
tion, or whether Congress would prefer a default rule that subjects executive
decisions not to enforce the law to deferential judicial review under the arbi-
trary and capricious standard.'20 For the foregoing reasons, it seems likely
that Congress would prefer the latter course of action. While this approach
is opposed by textualists for other reasons, it would limit the extent to which
unelected officials exercised unfettered discretion to allow deviations from
118. As with Chevron deference, the relevant provisions of the APA arguably cut the
other way. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAM L. REv. 157,
178-79 (1996). But cf. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (hold-
ing that federal courts can only entertain actions to "compel agency action unlawfully with-
held or unreasonably delayed" under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) of the APA "where a plaintiff asserts
that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take").
119. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 248-49 (2007) (describing the "sustained
reaction in Congress" to the controversy over the Bush-Cheney signing statements).
120. For examples of arguments in favor of the latter approach, see Heckler v. Cha-
ney, 470 U.S. 821, 840-42 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring); Bhagwat, supra note 118, at
182-91.
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unambiguous statutory language-and thereby comport more comfortably
with textualist theory.
This Part has shown that several legal doctrines that are strongly em-
braced by textualists cannot be squared with textualist theory. Those doc-
trines appear consistent with textualism at first blush because they purport
to cabin judicial discretion, but they simultaneously allow unelected offi-
cials in another branch of government to deviate from the deal that was
originally enacted by Congress in ways that conflict with textualism's un-
derstanding of the legislative process, the constitutional structure, and the
proper role of a faithful agent of Congress. At the same time, however,
those doctrines also shift policymaking authority from Congress and the
judiciary to the executive branch in ways that are consistent with unitary
executive theory-which was also developed during the Reagan Adminis-
tration and is fully embraced by the leading adherents of textualism."' The
remainder of this Article will contend that recent efforts by textualists to
square this package of theoretical commitments are either beside the point
or unpersuasive and that the new textualism and unconstrained executive
discretion are fundamentally incompatible with one another.
IV. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE
Textualists claim that a statute is a fragile compromise that should be
enforced according to its plain terms by the judiciary, but they also believe
that executive branch agencies should be given free reign to disregard many
statutory violations (Heckler) and greater flexibility to adopt reasonable
interpretations of the law (Chevron). As Judge Easterbrook has explained,
such agency decisions can and often will be "generated politically, by who
gains and loses, and by the agency's view of good outcomes."l22 Textualists
therefore have a very different understanding of the proper role of the judi-
ciary and executive branch agencies in implementing the law.
A. The Unwarranted Shift in Focus (An Internal Critique)
In recent years, a few prominent textualists have begun to recognize
the inherent tension between their contrasting views of judicial and adminis-
121. See Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Unitary Executive Interpretation: A Comment, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
313 (1993). See also Devins & Lewis, supra note 103, at 482 ("Reagan's pursuit of the
'unitary executive' through appointments, judicial filings, and regulatory review was a sea
change.").
122. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing Chevron). See
also Easterbrook, Not Enforcing, supra note 62, at 15 ("Making the most of a budget some-
times requires enforcers to make selective changes in the contours of the legal rules they
have been handed by Congress.").
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trative authority in the implementation of statutes. As Judge Easterbrook
has posed the questions, in the context of discussing Chevron:
If statutes are ambiguous, if it is reasonable or even inevitable for agencies to
exercise discretion when interpreting laws, if there is just no right answer, then
why can't judges do as agencies do? If the statute is addressed to an agency, then
the agency has discretion; if the statute is addressed to a judge, then the judge has
discretion. Recall that many themes of textualism-such as disregard of legislative
history because of the constitutional bicameralism rule and the idea that consistent
interpretation over time is part of what it means to say that statutes are law rather
than simply exhortations-seem to be as applicable to agencies as to judges. What
is more, the foundation for textualist interpretation-that judges must be faithful
agents of legislative decisions-seems no less applicable to agencies. Under Ar-
ticle II, the President and his staff are supposed to faithfully execute the law, not
manipulate the law. So if discretionary interpretation is OK for officers under Ar-
ticle II, why is it not OK for officers appointed under Article III? If textualism is
required for Article III officers, why not for Article II officers?
And if the judge has discretion, why not a policy-oriented discretion? Does it
not seem inconsistent for judges to deny themselves a power that they grant to the
Bureau of Prisons? Indeed, don't the rationales for deferring to administrative in-
terpretations show that the foundation of textualism on the bench is quicksand? If
there is no right answer for statutes addressed to agencies, there is no right answer
for statutes addressed to judges, and we had best face up to that fact.' 23
Judge Easterbrook's response to this quandary is to maintain that ex-
ecutive branch agencies should interpret statutes at a higher level of general-
ity than the federal judiciary. In other words, agencies should interpret sta-
tutes by abstracting away from "inputs" and concentrating on outcomes,
while the federal judiciary should read the law "as a code of things to do
rather than a set of objectives to achieve."l 24 This approach would result in
"a relatively unimaginative, mechanical process of interpretation in court,
coupled with a richer, more contextual method out of court." 25
Although this position is unsurprising, what is important for present
purposes is how Judge Easterbrook reaches his conclusions and whether his
analysis is consistent with textualist theory. He begins by distinguishing
between several types of administrative discretion and claiming that Che-
vron-style deference applies only when Congress has delegated lawmaking
authority to administrative agencies.126  He proceeds to explain that Con-
gress frequently delegates lawmaking authority to agencies rather than
courts because this course of action (1) promotes national uniformity by
allowing administrative agencies to make authoritative decisions regarding
their programs that are relatively insulated from second-guessing by a large
123. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted) (em-
phasis omitted).
124. Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted).
125. Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted).
126. See id. at 5-6.
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and diverse federal judiciary; (2) allows agencies to adjust the implementa-
tion of their programs in response to technological changes or shifts in the
political environment without the need for a statutory amendment; and (3)
facilitates political accountability by allowing policymaking decisions to be
made by administrative officials who are subject to ongoing presidential
control and legislative oversight. 2 7 On this last point, Judge Easterbrook
contrasts the life tenure and resulting independence of the federal judiciary,
which-in combination with the difficulty of amending statutes to override
their policy decisions-encourages courts to stray from the contemporary
political equilibrium in favor of their own preferences and eliminates the
electorate's ability to hold judges accountable for their decisions. Finally,
he points out that because courts do not control their own agendas and nec-
essarily resolve litigated issues in isolation, their decisions will potentially
distort legislative bargains in ways that cannot be restored through subse-
quent statutory amendments.'28 Agencies, in contrast, which are capable of
engaging in logrolling across issues, "can and do make multi-dimensional
decisions, creating packages to surmount political impasses."29 According
to Judge Easterbrook, these institutional differences between agencies and
courts imply "a big difference in appropriate interpretive strategy."'30
These arguments may persuasively explain why a reasonable amount
of executive discretion is necessary and appropriate, but they do not under-
mine the conclusion that the theoretical arguments for textualism apply to
most instances of executive branch statutory interpretation. In this regard,
modem textualism's use of political science for the proposition that "the
precise lines drawn by any statute may reflect unrecorded compromises
among interest groups, unknowable strategic behavior, or even an implicit
legislative decision to forego costly bargaining over greater textual preci-
sion," reflect observations about the legislative process that should hold
regardless of the identity of the subsequent interpreter."' The increased
bargaining power that is provided to political minorities by the constitution-
al requirements of bicameralism and presentment is also a fundamental
attribute of the legislative process. Finally, the incentives for Congress to
enact bright-line rules that are allegedly created by judicial independence
and the separation of governmental functions are expected to be manifested
in the legislative product. Since subgroups in Congress have the ability to
influence subsequent agency decisions pursuant to their oversight authori-
127. See id. at 7-10.
128. See id. at 10-12.
129. Id. at 12.
130. Id.
131. Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2390; see supra notes 22-26 and accompa-
nying text.
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ty,132 modem textualism's refusal to depart from the plain meaning of statu-
tory language to avoid political favoritism and promote political accounta-
bility should presumably be considered even more essential in this context.
Because the major theoretical arguments for textualism are based upon a
particular understanding of the legislative process and the constitutional
structure's role in influencing statutory products, it is difficult to see why
this methodology should be discarded simply because an executive branch
agency is implementing the statute rather than a federal court. In other
words, if textualism is required by a particular understanding of legislation,
the subsequent interpreter's identity should be irrelevant. Yet, Judge Eas-
terbrook's argument for the use of different interpretive strategies by agen-
cies and courts has everything to do with his understanding of the attributes
of the respective interpreters, and almost nothing to do with his understand-
ing of legislation.
The only aspect of his argument for distinctive interpretive approaches
that is concerned with fidelity to the original legislative deal is reflected by
his observation that "[1]itigation breaks bulk, and this implies a big differ-
ence in appropriate interpretive strategy.""' It is almost certainly true that
the manner in which issues are presented in litigation can distort multi-
faceted deals that were agreed upon by Congress. Yet, elected representa-
tives are surely aware of this possibility when they enact legislation, and
their deals are therefore properly understood to be contingent upon the re-
sults of subsequent litigation. More important, the fact that agencies typi-
cally have the authority to adopt multi-faceted bargains does not mean that
their actions will be more faithful to the decisions of the enacting Congress.
On the contrary, agencies are likely to use their discretionary authority to
enact "new deals" that are more likely than judicial decisions to deviate
from the original legislature's expectations over time.'34 Thus, the lone as-
pect of Judge Easterbrook's argument that pays lip service to the importance
of respecting the original legislative deal paradoxically endorses a practice
that is likely to result in even more significant departures from this ideal.
In a similar vein, Professors Jack Goldsmith and John Manning have
recently articulated a new understanding of presidential power that provides
the executive branch with substantial discretionary authority in precisely
those areas of statutory implementation that are the most relevant for
present purposes. Specifically, they claim that Article II of the Constitution
should be understood to provide the President with a "completion power,"
which enables him "to prescribe incidental details needed to carry into ex-
ecution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of congressional authori-
132. See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to
Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1443 (2003).
133. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 12.
134. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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zation to complete that scheme."' This completion power is defeasible in
the sense that "Congress can limit it, for example, by denying the President
the authority to complete a statute through certain means or by specifying
the manner in which a statute must be implemented."'3  Nonetheless, "in
the absence of such affirmative legislative limitation or specification, courts
and Presidents have recognized an Article II power of some uncertain scope
to complete a legislative scheme."'3 ' According to Goldsmith and Manning,
the President's completion power explains, among other things, the broad
enforcement discretion that is accorded to the executive branch, as well as
the judiciary's practice of deferring to reasonable interpretations of ambi-
guous statutory provisions by executive branch agencies.'13
The President's completion power may, in fact, provide a useful way
to understand the foregoing instances of executive branch discretion. By
grounding the President's authority in Article II of the Constitution, this
theory eliminates the need to justify absolute enforcement discretion and
Chevron deference by resorting to unreliable notions of Congress's pre-
sumed intent. The theory also recognizes that because Congress cannot
adopt "a pellucid and all-encompassing code" on any given subject, the
implementation of the law will necessarily require substantial policy discre-
tion.'39 The problem, once again, is that the President's completion power
conflicts with the theory of the legislative process and constitutional struc-
ture that underlies modem textualism. As explained above, unconstrained
enforcement discretion grants executive branch agencies the authority to
disregard the plain terms of statutory deals, and similar tendencies are at
least subtly implicit in Chevron. These doctrines should therefore be prob-
lematic for textualists, regardless of whether they are purportedly justified
by presumed legislative intent or inherent executive authority. Since John
Manning, in particular, is widely considered the legal academy's strongest
proponent of the new textualism, his apparent willingness to endorse the
President's completion power is a bit puzzling.'40
The tension between modem textualism and the President's comple-
tion power is most evident if one considers the purported rationale for the
latter doctrine. In this regard, Goldsmith and Manning trace the genesis of
135. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 2282.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 2293-95, 2298-2302.
139. See id. at 2305.
140. Goldsmith and Manning expressly state that their discussion of the President's
completion power is only intended to be preliminary and descriptive, and that they are not
necessarily endorsing the doctrine. See id. at 2887. Nonetheless, the tenor of the Article
suggests that they are at least sympathetic to the idea of endorsing this practice.
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the President's completion power to Chief Justice Vinson's dissent in the
Steel Seizure Case.14 ' As Goldsmith and Manning explain it:
Vinson described the legislative program at a high level of generality and implicit-
ly conceded that it contained no mandate, express or implied, to seize the steel
mills in the circumstances before the Court. Nonetheless, in Vinson's judgment,
the successful execution of a vast body of legislative commitments depended upon
the President's ability to keep the mills functioning.' 4 2
Goldsmith and Manning read Vinson's opinion to conclude that, based
in part on some historical precedent, "the executive Power and the Take
Care Clause include a completion power that enables the President to go
beyond (but not against) the implemental prescriptions of particular statutes,
when necessary to effectuate the legislative program." 43 They proceed to
contend that although Vinson lost the battle in this case, he subsequently
won the war over executive power because the President's completion pow-
er has been incorporated into the law in a variety of important ways.'" This
has occurred, moreover, precisely because unanticipated situations will in-
evitably arise when the law is implemented that were never explicitly re-
solved by Congress.145
The essential point for present purposes is that the President's comple-
tion power is, in effect, a strongly purposive approach to implementing sta-
tutes. The idea is that statutes are inherently ambiguous because of the im-
precision of language and the limited foresight of lawmakers. Public offi-
cials who are responsible for implementing the law will therefore necessari-
ly have substantial discretion, which should be exercised in a manner that
leads to the "successful execution" of "legislative programs" under the rele-
vant circumstances. President Truman's decision to seize the steel mills
should therefore arguably have been permitted because it was a sensible
means of promoting the successful war effort that underlay "a vast body of
legislative commitments." Indeed, the President's completion power is im-
plicitly based upon the same theories of the legislative process and constitu-
tional structure as purposivism. For example, it appears to presume that
legislators are "reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasona-
bly."'46 Similarly, it appears to presume that statutes are ordinarily designed
141. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667 (1957) (Vin-
son, C.J., dissenting).
142. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 2284.
143. Id. at 2285 (internal quotations omitted).
144. See id. at 2287-2302.
145. See id. at 2304-08.
146. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378 (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (1958).
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to achieve instrumental purposes that will promote the public good.14 7 And,
if all of this is true, why shouldn't courts also have authority to implement
statutes purposively in the cases and controversies before them (viz., "to go
beyond (but not against) the implemental prescriptions of particular statutes,
when necessary to effectuate the legislative program")? Yet, leading tex-
tualists, including John Manning, have vigorously attacked these under-
standings of legislation and their implications for statutory interpretation by
the judiciary.148  Manning-like Easterbrook and Scalia-therefore has a
completely different understanding of the role of the judiciary and the ex-
ecutive branch in implementing statutes that is based upon fundamentally
incompatible theories of legislation.
B. The Problematic Resort to Formalism (An External Critique)
Because textualism's understanding of legislation would compel ex-
ecutive agencies to interpret statutes in a textualist fashion, textualists who
disagree with this result naturally change the subject when they advocate "a
richer, more contextual method" of interpretation by agencies. Their ap-
proach is to rely upon formal distinctions among governmental functions
and between law and policy, in addition to claiming that executive branch
agencies are politically accountable while the federal judiciary is not. Set-
ting aside the internal incoherence and unwarranted shift in focus that was
described in the preceding section, there are major shortcomings with these
arguments as well.
First, statutory ambiguity is used as a signal under Chevron that an in-
terpretive issue is a policy matter that should presumably be resolved in an
authoritative manner by politically accountable officials within the execu-
tive branch, rather than a legal issue that should be resolved by the indepen-
dent judiciary.'49 It should be clear, however, from the earlier discussion of
this framework that ascertaining whether a statute is ambiguous can itself be
a matter of great uncertainty.' Courts will therefore necessarily be called
147. See Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, supra note 6, at 1026 (describing the civic
republic understandings of the legislative process and constitutional structure that underlie
strongly purposive approaches to statutory interpretation).
148. See, e.g., Manning, Textualism, supra note 5; Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7,
at 2395-2419.
149. See Pierce, supra note 11, at 199-205 (explaining that Chevron's framework
distinguishes between judicial interpretation and agency policymaking).
150. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1039, 1091 (1997) (recognizing that the line between clarity and ambiguity
under Chevron "has a highly random aspect to it," and claiming that textualists have a ten-
dency to apply the doctrine in a manner whereby "judicial intervention" comes to resemble
"Russian Roulette: one never knows in advance when the chamber will fire, but when it does
the result will often be fatal to agency policy"); Molot, supra note 3, at 51 (explaining that
Chevron's dichotomy between clarity and ambiguity "is inherently manipulable").
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upon to determine the boundaries of law and policy and thereby to allocate
governmental authority. To the extent that textualism resolves close cases
by expanding the scope of law and the corresponding degree of judicial
authority under step one of the Chevron framework, this interpretive method
squarely conflicts with the primary reasons for deference to executive au-
thority that are otherwise articulated by textualists. To the extent that tex-
tualists resolve close cases by finding statutory ambiguity and deferring to
reasonable agency interpretations under step two of Chevron, they may no
longer be adhering to textualism.
Meanwhile, textualists tend to defend absolute enforcement discretion
on the grounds that enforcement decisions are at bottom policy determina-
tions that should be made by politically accountable officials.'" While the
promulgation of a statute or regulation presumably reflects "a deal" regard-
ing the substantive content of "the law," the executive's enforcement deci-
sions are another matter altogether.'52 The meaning of a statute or regula-
tion is governed by law and is therefore the proper subject of interpretation
by courts in an Article III case or controversy. Yet, a decision not to en-
force a statute or regulation in the first instance is a policy matter that pre-
sumably falls within the absolute discretion of the executive branch and is
therefore not properly subject to judicial review. A contrary decision would
allow politically unaccountable courts to interfere with the executive's abili-
ty to make politically acceptable decisions and potentially displace the poli-
cy choices of administrative agencies in favor of the preferred interests of
the courts.'"I
A willingness to embrace textualism and unbridled enforcement dis-
cretion is therefore premised on at least three basic assumptions. First,
elected officials (and, in turn, the regulators whom they oversee) are ac-
countable to the general public in a meaningful way. Second, a formal divi-
sion between law and policy can be maintained. Third, a formal distinction
among executive, legislative, and judicial functions is sustainable. Each of
these assumptions is problematic, particularly in the context of official deci-
sions not to enforce otherwise applicable legal rules.
Although the notion that democratically elected officials are accounta-
ble to the people has been treated as gospel in modern public law theory and
doctrine,'54 this proposition has recently begun to receive critical scrutiny
151. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Not Enforcing, supra note 62, at 14-15; Scalia, Responsi-
bilities, supra note 62, at 105-08.
152. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
153. Textualists, of course, also defend strong deference to administrative agencies
under the second step of Chevron for similar reasons. See supra notes 88-89, 112 and ac-
companying text (describing a textualist conception of the Chevron framework and noting
that Justice Scalia is a sharp critic of hard-look judicial review).
154. For example, this idea provides the impetus for the countermajorian difficulty in
constitutional law, which has been the central obsession in constitutional scholarship in the
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from legal scholars and political scientists.'" Most voters do not have de-
tailed information about the activities of their elected representatives or
make voting decisions on this basis.'16 It is therefore unlikely that voters
hold elected officials "accountable" for their policy decisions in the manner
that seems to be envisioned by the conventional rhetoric."' Moreover, the
notion that voters are capable of holding a chief executive (or, for that mat-
ter, the members of a legislative oversight committee) electorally accounta-
ble for the discretionary policy choices of administrative agencies (includ-
ing particular non-enforcement decisions) seems preposterous, except in
truly extraordinary circumstances."' Textualists could, of course, always
rely upon formal theories of representation for the idea that elected officials
have greater democratic legitimacy than unelected decision makers, but this
particular view would neither prove that elected officials are truly accounta-
ble to the voters nor explain why administrative agencies have greater dem-
ocratic legitimacy than the courts.
Textualists must therefore also believe that the political influence of
the chief executive and legislature will make administrative agencies more
responsive to the current will of the people."' This could occur if elected
United States for more than fifty years. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); see also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession:
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002)
("For decades, legal academics have struggled with the 'countermajoritarian difficulty': the
problem of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccounta-
ble judges in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy.").
155. See generally Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (2005); Jane S. Schacter, Political Accoun-
tability, Proxy Accountability, and the Democratic Legitimacy ofLegislatures, in THE LEAST
EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 47 (Richard
W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountabili-
ty, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1253 (2009) [hereinafter Staszewski, Reason-Giving].
156. See Schacter, supra note 155, at 47-48; Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitu-
tional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1287 (2004).
157. See Schacter, supra note 155, at 45-48; Staszewski, Reason-Giving, supra note
155, at 1265-77.
158. Cf Staszewski, Reason-Giving, supra note 155, at 1270-71.
159. See Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 9 (explaining that "judges
have tenure to make it easier (because less costly) for them to be faithful to decisions taken
in the past," and claiming that "[i]f these decisions are to be updated, that should be done by
those who are supposed to be sensitive to the contemporary will-administrative officials,
Congress, the President"); Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 73, at 518 ("If Congress is
to delegate broadly, as modem times are thought to demand, it seems to me desirable that the
delegee be able to suit its actions to the times, and that continuing political accountability be
assured, through direct political pressures upon the Executive and through the indirect politi-
cal pressure of congressional oversight."); Scalia, Responsibilities, supra note 62, at 107
("The major factor in [the judiciary's] exclusion [from making policy decisions], I suggest, is
that the decisions are supposed to be political ones-made by institutions whose managers
[Vol. 2009:143176
HeinOnline -- 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 176 2009
Textualism and the Executive Branch
officials had a clear mandate from the voters and acted consistent with their
expectations, but it seems unlikely in an era that is characterized by a close-
ly divided electorate with limited knowledge of, or opinions about, the de-
tailed policy questions that confront agencies." It could also occur, how-
ever, if elected representatives vigorously pursued the apparent preferences
of their constituents who stood to be affected by particular administrative
decisions. In other words, agencies may be accountable to the voters be-
cause elected representatives exert political pressure on agencies to adopt
policies that further the pre-political interests of their constituents.
Although it is likely that this is the type of political accountability that
textualists ultimately have in mind, they seem to disregard the lessons of
public choice theory that underlie their approach to statutory interpretation
in the public administration context. If narrow private interests have orga-
nizational advantages that allow them to extract "rents" from the general
public in exchange for providing support to self-interested public officials,
the implementation of a theory that relies upon elected representatives to
exert political pressure on agencies to further the interests of their "constitu-
ents" is a recipe for disaster (or, at least, regulatory capture).'"' Justice Sca-
lia's position that statutory beneficiaries (i.e., "the majority") do not need
any outside assistance in the "political process" of administrative decision
making may therefore be unwarranted.'62 On the contrary, public choice
theory tells us that the diffuse public interests that are typically promoted by
modem social welfare legislation will systematically be disadvantaged by
an unregulated administrative process.'
change with each presidential election and which are under the constant political pressure of
the congressional authorization and appropriations processes.").
160. See Staszewski, Reason-Giving, supra note 155, at 1266-68, 1271 (describing
the limited political knowledge of American citizens and explaining that "the vast majority
of regulatory decision making flies beneath the general public's radar and implicates estab-
lished preferences of the electorate only at very high levels of abstraction").
161. See McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
EcoNoMics 106 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Stephen Shavell eds., Handbooks in Economics No.
27, 2007) ("If elected officials are a willing co-conspirator in agency capture, evidence that
they influence policy will not assuage fears that the public interest is subverted.").
162. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. See also Eric Biber, The Impor-
tance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 56-57 (2008)
(recognizing that Justice Scalia's view of standing "fails to incorporate the lessons of public
choice theory," and claiming that government decisions that harm most of the general public
are "precisely those types of defaults that might be most likely not to receive fair considera-
tion in the normal political process, assuming an asymmetry between the distribution of costs
and benefits"); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 215-20, 219 (1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia's theory
of standing and pointing out that "some majorities are so diffuse and ill-organized that they
face systematic transaction costs barriers to the exercise of ongoing political influence").
163. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 34-41, 39-40 (1998) (describing the central aspects of public
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There is no reason to believe that this concern is inapplicable to non-
enforcement decisions (or the resolution of statutory ambiguity). Rather,
the choice regarding whether to investigate or prosecute an apparent viola-
tion of the law provides a quintessential example of governmental action
that significantly affects a concentrated private interest with only a relative-
ly marginal impact on the disorganized general public. This would there-
fore be the ideal context for governmental officials to favor narrow private
interests over the public good to promote their own selfish interests, regard-
less of the actual merits of a case.'"
In addition to their selective use of public choice theory, textualists al-
so seem to have a schizophrenic understanding of the proper role of a "faith-
ful agent of the legislature." Specifically, the new textualism is premised
upon the notion that the complex and competitive nature of the legislative
process renders a conception of legislative intent distinct from enacted sta-
tutory language "meaningless," and therefore "the only safe course for a
faithful agent is to enforce the clear terms of the statutes that have emerged
from that process."'65 Meanwhile, however, textualists also believe that the
President, who is charged by the Constitution with "tak[ing] Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,"' 66 has absolute discretion (often through his
choice theory and explaining that from this perspective, "[interest groups with the most at
stake in a particular regulatory decision, who spend the most to buy that decision, typically
see their demand for regulation met by legislators who acquiesce in order to enjoy continued
electoral success and the benefits that holding office brings"). Justice Scalia candidly recog-
nized (and perhaps endorsed) this possibility when he lamented the demise of limitations on
standing that resulted from judicial decisions during the 1970s:
As recently as two decades ago, much of the agencies' ability to operate as part of
the political process was attributable to the doctrines of ripeness and standing....
The doctrine of standing, [in particular], was almost tailor-made to protect political
discretion. It is rudimentary political science that slight harm, expense or inconve-
nience imposed upon a large, diffuse body of the population will generally not
arouse effective political opposition. But diffuseness, expansiveness, lack of parti-
cularity was what the doctrine of standing was all about. In other words, it ex-
cluded from the courts precisely those interests that were likely to lose in a rule-
making proceeding with substantial political content-the potential hikers and
campers who would be harmed by construction of a new ski-resort, to take a real-
life example.
Scalia, Rulemaking, supra note 65, at xxvi (emphasis supplied) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
164. See Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 Nw. U. L.
REv. 297, 306 (2004) ("Heckler v. Chaney arose in a setting-nonenforcement-in which
concerns about agency capture would seem particularly pronounced."). Lisa Bressman has
argued that non-enforcement decisions should be subject to judicial review and that agencies
should be obligated to adopt enforcement standards largely for this reason. See Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1657 (2004).
165. Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2390.
166. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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subordinates) to decline to enforce the clear terms of the statutes that have
emerged from exactly the same legislative process. 6 7 Accordingly, textual-
ists plainly understand the very existence and nature of the duty of fidelity
that is owed to Congress to vary depending upon whether the "faithful
agent" that is implementing the law is a member of the executive branch or
the judiciary.
It is not clear, however, why this disparity should exist, particularly in
the context of those enforcement decisions that involve unambiguous viola-
tions of plain statutory language. The preceding discussion has explained
that alleged differences in the political accountability of the decision makers
do not justify the executive's broad and unconstrained enforcement discre-
tion. Moreover, the claim that the judiciary must enforce "the law," while
the executive is free to exercise "policy discretion," is unconvincing in this
context because both decision makers are, in reality, doing exactly the same
thing-i.e., choosing whether to recognize an exception to an otherwise
applicable statutory rule based on the particular circumstances."' For simi-
lar reasons, reliance upon a formal understanding of separated powers is
tautological in this context because the official recognition of exceptions to
otherwise applicable statutory language could be understood as legislation
(the text is, after all, effectively being amended), interpretation (such as
where the judiciary avoids absurd results), or execution of the law.'69 Final-
ly, it is difficult to see why Congress would distinguish so sharply between
the responsibilities of the governmental officials who are responsible for
implementing its "deals."'70
Because the new textualism's conception of the obligations of a faith-
ful agent of Congress is allegedly mandated by the Constitution based on a
particular understanding of the legislative process and the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment, the same principles should apply regardless
of who is implementing Congress's mandate. It should presumably be un-
constitutional under this view for the legislature to delegate unbridled dis-
cretionary authority to disregard the plain meaning of duly enacted statutes
167. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
168. See Bhagwat, supra note 118, at 176 (explaining that "it is a relatively elementa-
ry legal realist insight that when there is a single enforcement authority, a decision not to
enforce under stated circumstances is indistinguishable from amending the underlying 'rule'
to exempt the affected conduct from prohibition," and claiming that "[t]he contrary view,
that enforcement policy is fundamentally different from 'law,' rests on a formalistic defini-
tion of law which has been largely discarded since the realist revolution of a half century
ago").
169. Cf M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation ofPowers
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 604 (2001) ("The effort to identify and separate governmental
powers fails because, in the contested cases, there is no principled way to distinguish be-
tween the relevant powers.").
170. See supra notes 100-120 and accompanying text.
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to either the judiciary or the executive branch (even, or perhaps especially,
if Congress actually wanted those officials to favor particular special inter-
ests).'"' Instead of condemning the Court's stance toward non-enforcement
decisions by agencies on these grounds, however, textualists maintain that
"the balancing of various legal, practical and political considerations, none
of which is absolute, is the very essence of prosecutorial discretion."I72
Of course, textualists could defend their views on enforcement discre-
tion by resorting to an established historical tradition.7 3 It is certainly true
that, with some exceptions, courts have traditionally declined to review en-
forcement decisions in both the criminal and civil contexts.'74 Yet, a re-
liance on historical tradition as the basis for justifying their views on en-
forcement discretion places an increased premium on the ability of textual-
ists to show that their preferred methodology of statutory interpretation by
courts is supported by an established historical tradition as well. Professor
Manning has ambitiously attempted to satisfy this burden,"' but his histori-
cal claims about the original meaning of "the judicial power" in statutory
interpretation have been persuasively refuted by other leading scholars. For
instance, William Eskridge has concluded that the arguments underlying
Manning's claim that equitable interpretive techniques are incompatible
with the American constitutional structure-and that textualism is constitu-
tionally required-are entirely unsupported by a comprehensive examina-
tion of the relevant founding-era materials:
It is noteworthy that Manning was unable to find a single Framer or a single judge
of the period who expressed the link[s] he insists upon. In an article brimming
with quotations, unearthed in what must have been a massive research program, it
is amazing that he was not able to come up with even one quotation supporting the
central claim of his paper. The reason is that lawyers of the period, including im-
171. Cf Manning, Absurdity, supra note 7, at 2440-45 (claiming that Congress could
not lawfully authorize the judiciary to exercise discretion to interpret statutory language
contrary to its plain meaning to avoid absurd results).
172. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. The extent to which Justice Scalia's views on standing and presidential power
are supported by the established historical tradition are subject to dispute. See Farber, supra
note 59, at 1533-35 (claiming that "Scalia's general view of presidential power is at odds
with much of mainstream historical scholarship"); Sunstein, supra note 162, at 215-21 (criti-
cizing Justice Scalia's theory of standing partly on historical grounds).
174. On the other hand, private rights of action against alleged violators of the law
were sometimes authorized by Congress in early American history. See, e.g., Harold J.
Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38
AM. U. L. REv. 275, 290-303 (1989); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14-22 (1994). To the extent that private citi-
zens could initiate their own enforcement actions, there would be less need for judicial re-
view of non-enforcement decisions by public officials.
175. See Manning, Textualism, supra note 5.
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portant Framers, did not .... view the role of equity in statutory interpretation as
judicial legislation, as Manning seems to do.17 6
Professor Eskridge found instead that while early statutory interpretation
began with the words of the text, founding-era courts actually utilized "a
sophisticated methodology that knit together text, context, purpose, and
democratic and constitutional norms in the service of carrying out the judi-
ciary's constitutional role."l 77
Even if textualists could satisfy the burden of showing that the "new
textualism" is supported by an established historical tradition, they would
merely have established that unconstrained enforcement discretion and tex-
tualism have this in common. The tensions between textualism and Che-
vron and between textualist theory and broad administrative discretion that
were described above would still remain. Accordingly, unless historical
tradition should be the be-all and end-all of public law theory and doctrine,
the new textualism cannot be squared with the views that textualists have
adopted with respect to the executive branch."'
176. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the
"Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1038-39
(2001).
177. Id. at 990, 1009-30, 1058-87. See also Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic
Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEx. L. REv. 339, 373-74
(2005) (claiming that "to the extent that textualists argue that the Constitution requires courts
to follow a 'faithful agent' model of the judicial role that forbids all judicial departures from
statutory text, they are relying on a textually and historically inappropriate understanding of
the Constitution"); Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law,
78 B.U. L. REv. 1023, 1094-98 (1998) (claiming that the historical understanding of the
judicial power, which was reflected in Blackstone's commentaries and early Supreme Court
decisions, allowed courts to deviate from the plain meaning of statutory text in certain cases).
178. It bears noting that textualist judges have frequently been accused of pursuing a
conservative political agenda. See Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 18-19
("One theme you hear in the press, the halls of Congress, and the legal academy is that the
move to textualism is political, a conservative reaction to laws enacted by Congresses to the
left of those appointing the judges."). Although a thorough evaluation of this claim is
beyond the scope of this Article, the preceding analysis may provide some preliminary sup-
port for the proposition that their broader package of theoretical commitments has a tendency
to lead towards deregulation. Thus, it is commonly understood that it is difficult for Con-
gress to enact a statute in light of the requirements of bicameralism and presentment. See
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 18, at 65-69. Given the dynamics emphasized by public choice
theory, it should be even more difficult for the legislature to enact public health, safety, or
environmental legislation. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROuPS (rev. ed., 1971). When elected officials
are nonetheless successful in this endeavor, the new textualism arguably makes it more diffi-
cult for Congress to achieve its underlying objectives because courts have a tendency to
interpret the law in a relatively stingy fashion pursuant to this methodology. See Jane S.
Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure ofLegitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,
108 HARv. L. REv. 593, 636-46 (1995) (describing the "disciplinarian" approach to statutory
interpretation that is employed by textualists and their tendency to employ "narrow, text-
based interpretation that limits the reach of legislation by requiring exacting specificity in
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CONCLUSION
Modem textualism and the theory of a powerful, unitary executive
were developed around the same time by many of the same Reagan Admin-
istration officials and their intellectual allies. Both theories have proven
tremendously influential over the years and have been strongly promoted by
the latest Bush administration. Although both theories are united in their
purported efforts to cabin "judicial activism," it has almost entirely escaped
notice that they are fundamentally incompatible. Modem textualism relies
upon theories of the legislative process and constitutional structure that un-
derstand legislation as a fragile compromise that should be enforced accord-
ing to its plain terms. Yet, a powerful, unitary executive should presump-
tively be given absolute enforcement discretion and substantial flexibility to
interpret the law consistent with his own contemporary policy preferences,
even when those decisions could deviate substantially from the original
legislative deal. Adherents of both theories therefore simultaneously main-
tain that "the balancing of various legal, practical and political considera-
tions" is at the core of the executive function, but that any judicial efforts to
balance similar considerations in particular cases would depart from "the
government of laws that the Constitution established" and no longer qualify
as "a government of laws at all."' 79
Leading textualists have recently begun to recognize the undeniable
tension between their views on statutory interpretation by courts and the
proper degree of executive branch authority. Those efforts at reconciliation
are beside the point, however, because the primary theoretical arguments for
textualism would continue to apply to most instances of executive branch
statutory interpretation. At the same time, formal distinctions between law
and policy and among governmental functions are not particularly meaning-
ful in the relevant contexts, and the President is not really politically ac-
countable to the electorate for these decisions. On the contrary, the lessons
of public choice theory that underlie modern textualism teach us that we
should be especially worried about the dangers of capture by narrow special
interests in precisely these areas.
The point of this Article, of course, is not to claim that it is inappro-
priate for the judiciary to defer to reasonable interpretations of ambiguous
statutory language"); cf Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 24. Even if the statuto-
ry language unambiguously authorized the relevant agency and the judiciary to implement
social welfare legislation in an aggressive fashion, the executive branch could use its abso-
lute enforcement discretion to ignore clear statutory violations. See supra notes 60-64 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the judiciary could decline to recognize the standing of regu-
latory beneficiaries to challenge the executive branch's inaction. See supra notes 65-72 and
accompanying text.
179. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708, 711-12 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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statutes by administrative agencies.180 Nor is it to contend that agencies
should be precluded from exercising a reasonable amount of enforcement
discretion.18 ' Rather, the point of this Article is to show that a legal theory
that simultaneously embraces the new textualism and unbridled executive
discretion is fundamentally incoherent. A faithful agent of Congress could
always adhere to the plain meaning of statutory language or exercise a rea-
sonable degree of policy discretion, but a true believer in modem textualism
cannot have it both ways. When textualists nonetheless advocate broad and
unconstrained executive discretion, they are effectively acknowledging that
their understanding of the legislative process and constitutional structure is
ultimately not controlling. Although a heavy emphasis on the text could
still be defended in statutory interpretation on other grounds, modem tex-
tualist theory loses most of its content and force when stripped of those un-
derpinnings.
180. For my own brief take on Chevron deference, see Staszewski, Reason-Giving,
supra note 155, at 1305-06.
181. For some of my thoughts on these questions, see id. at 1306-08; Glen Staszews-
ki, The Federal Inaction Commission, 58 EMORY L.J. _ (forthcoming 2009).
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